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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
W. B. RUSSELL,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant.

Case No.
7647

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN
ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING
Comes now the defendant in the above cause and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court to deny plaintiff's
Petition for Rehearing for the reasons that:

I.
The court in its opinion did not err in holding that the
lower court had no juris diction to order the plaintiff's reinstatement with the defendant company.
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II.
The court did not err in holding that the statements
in the transcr:ipt relating to plaintiff's illness were hearsay,
and did not err in holding that the lower cour:t was in error
in considering such statements as substantive evidence.

III.
The court did not err in holding that the transcript
was improperly considered by the lower court as the exclusive evidence of the facts therein testified to.

IV.
The court did not err in holding that the lower court
committed reversible error in rejecting defendant's evidence
that the plaintiff had falsified at the hearing and was in
fact not ill during the period in question.

v.
The court did not err in holding that the defendant
had a right to present any legal o~_ equitable defense at
the trial to prove justification for the discharge and that
the trial court committed reversible error in rejecting such
proffered testimony.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING REHEARING
Out of deference to the rules governing the format of
briefs on appeal before this court we have set forth above
the negative of the five propositions asserted by counsel
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for the plaintiff in his brief on petition for rehearing.
Only two propositions are in fact arg·ued by the plaintiff
and he sets them forth on page 5 of his brief as follows:
The court erred in holding that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to order the plaintiff's reinstatement with defendant company with seniority
rights unimpaired.
"(1)

The court erred in holding that it was
for the trial court to determine whether the grounds
for discharge in fact existed, and in this determination it was not limited to the transcript of the hearing."
"(2)

ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE PLAINTIFF'S REINSTATEMENT WITH DEFENDANT COMpANY WITH SENIORITY RIGHTS UNIMPAIRED.
It is here said that the court's action-was purely "gra- tuitous" for the reason that the issue of reinstatement was
not involved. The plaintiff says that he is not concerned
with this "error" in the opinion and then proceeds to cite
four cases on page 6 of the brief in support of his assertion that it was error to hold that the lower court was without jurisdiction even if reinstatement had been an issue.
All of the cases cited, in so far as they conflict with the
recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in
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·slocum v. Dela~vare, Lackawana & Western Railroad, 339
U. S. 239, 94 L. Ed. 534, 70 S. Ct. 577, on the matter of
reinstatement have been overruled and superseded by this
opinion of the court of last resort. We do not care to discuss. the propriety of this court's discussion of the matter
of reinstatement at any length. We think neither the
opinion nor the "general policy" of the court needs any
defense from us in ·this .respect. The plaintiff has refused
to recognize the existence of the Slocum case throughout
the trial and throughout the briefs on appeal. The trial
court also refused to recognize the existence of the Slocum
case and this was the "fundamental error" as pointed out
in the opinion. In reaching the conclusion in this case
that a common-law action for damages for breach of contract and nothing else was available to plaintiff, as held
in the Slocum case and as contended for by the defendant
throughout, it was proper and necessary for this court to
consider and discuss the rationale of the Slocum case. We
do not think that the court was "gratuitously" deciding
an issue not before it when during its discussion of the
Slocum case as a whole it pointed out that the lower court
was correct in refusing reinstatement. The court was reviewing an entirely new concept of the law on the rights
and liabilities of parties to collective bargaining agreements
under the Railway Labor Act as they were redefined in the
·slocum case, wh~ch decision was not written until April
of 1950. It was necessary to an understanding of and
formed the basis of the court's treatment of the specific
assignments of error which the court was called upon to
dispose of. After the discussion objected to, the opinion
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proceeded to say that while the trial court had correctly
held it had no jurisdiction to grant reinstatement it "proceeded to adjudicate the case in all other respects in the
same manner as might be done by such Board (National
Railroad Adjustment Board). In so doing we are confident it erred. Thus concluding relative to the fundamental
error alleged, we address ourselves to the several assignments of error with more particularity." At any rate we
do not understand counsel's concern over the matter for
he must be well aware of the fact that if reinstatement
was, as he says, not in issue, anything this court said thereon could only be considered as dicta.

II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT IT WAS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE
GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE IN FACT EXISTED, AND DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT IN DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE EXISTED THE PARTIES WERE NOT CONFINED
TO THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING.
This is nothing but Point III in plaintiff's main brief
on appeal, appearing at page 21 thereof. For the convenience of the court we quote from plaintiff's main brief:
"Point III. The trial court did not err in limiting the evidence on the question of whether or
not defendant had breached the collective bargain-
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ing agreement solely upon the transcript of the unsworn testimony given at the official investigation,
in refusing to admit evidence proffered by the defendant to show justification for plaintiff's dismissal, and in refusing to permit the defendant to prove
that the plaintiff's testimony contained in said transcript was false."
This court holds the court did err therein. The point
was argued at length in plaintiff's main brief on appeal,
and while it is argued further and in greater detail in the
brief on Petition for Rehearing it does not seem to us that
counsel presents anything new. This court in its opinion
has properly held that the question plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of is one to be determined by the trial court
after a proper hearing, which was not· accorded the defendant in the court below.
Plaintiff says on page 3 of his brief, "What we here
seek is a reconsideration by the court of the single question
of whether this plaintiff was accorded his contractual
rights, that is, was Rule 38 of the contract complied with."
From a careful reading of plaintiff's entire brief and
analysis thereof it is apparent that there is in fact, as
counsel himself says, just this one question which is submitted to the court for reconsideration. For convenience
we again quote the language of the rule :
"Article VIII, Rule 38. No yardman will be
suspended or dismissed. without first having a fair
and impartial hearing and his guilt established. The
man whose case is under consideration may be represented by an employe of his choice, who may be
a committeeman, who will be permitted to interrogate witnesses. The accused and his representative
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shall be permitted to hear the testimony of witnesses."
Counsel says that the following five conditions to proper
discharge are required by the rule:
(1)

A fair and impartial hearing;

( 2)

The right to be represented;

. (3)

The right to interrogate witnesses;

( 4)

The right to hear the testimony of witnesses;

( 5)

The establishment of his guilt.

The burden of plaintiff's argument is that these matters ·
were not established prior to the discharge. Counsel's whole
trouble, it seems to us, is in th~ failure to recognize that
whether these matters were or were not established prior
to the discharge is, first, a matter for determination by a
court or jury, and second, "having elected to bring a common-law action for wrongful discharge, the common-law
principles relative to such action apply to the trial of the
case", quoting from the court's opinion.
We think the foregoing is the gist of the court's opinion
and it is, by plaintiff's own assertion, the portion of the
opinion excepted to in· his petition for rehearing. The holding is consistent with every adjudicated case we have been
able to find; we have found none to the contrary and
counsel cites none to the contrary that have not been swept
into the discard by the Slocum decision. This court's holding recognizes and respects the holding of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Slocum case; that the
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discharged employe may have a common-law action for
damages for breach of contract in ~he courts of the land,
but nothing else. And because that is the nature of the
action, it is bound to follow that the court and jury must
determine whether or not the contract has been breached,
and .either party to. the action in a court of law has the
right to produce any and all material, relevant and competent evidence in existence bearing upon that issue.
It is evident from an analysis of plaintiff's brief that
the whole of his attack is leveled at the holding of the court
set out in the following paragraph, to wit:
"Several assignments of error, presently to be
individually considered, are bottomed on one fundamental contention. Defendant concedes that the respondent, although a railway labor employee and
subject to the Railway Labor Act, might prosecute
an action in the District court for wrongful disGharge. But it contends that the respondent, having
elected to bring a common-law action for wrongful
discharge, the common-law principles relative to such
action apply to the trial of the case; and that the
court is without jurisdiction to construe the contract
and to apply its provisions in such manner as might
be done by the Railroad Adjustment Board pursuant
to the provision of the National Railway Labor
Act. (U. S. Code, Title 45, Chapter 8.) Appellant's

position on this fundamental proposition is sound.
That a distinction exists between proceedings before
such Board and the awards which might be made
by it, and a common-law action before the courts is,
we think, abundantly clear from the cases of Slocum
v. Delaware, Lackawana and Western Railroad, 339
U. S. 239, 94 L. Ed. 534, 70 S. Ct. 577, and Moore
v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 312 U. S. 630,
61 S. Ct. 754." (Italics ours.)
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The position taken by this court in the above quoted passage is we submit absolutely sound in the light of the cases
therein cited. The plaintiff asks this court, without citing
a single authority in point, to ignore the authorities supporting its position and reverse itself on this one "fundamental contention" made· by the defendant throughout this
litigation. To do so would be for this court to reverse itself
upon every point decided, except the issue of damages,
which plaintiff's counsel concedes is correctly decided, and
would require the court to remand the case to the lower
court solely· for the purpose of fixing the amount of damages. The holding of the court in the above quoted paragraph is not only supported by the authorities therein referred to, but by the case of Tennison v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., ... Mo.... , 228 S. W. 2d 718, and
Johnson v. Thompson, ... Mo .... , 236 S. W. 2d 1, cited
and discussed in the defendant's brief on appeal. The
Tennison case was in point on the facts and the court
therein refused to admit the transcript of the testimony at
the official investigation on the ground that it was hearsay.
The court said:
"What the contract provided was that trainmen
would not be discharged 'without just and sufficient
cause'. Methods were provided for a full investigation of charges and hearing of the employee's side
before action. (The point so stressed by plaintiff
here.) However, defendant is no more precluded
thereby from litigating in court the issue of 'just
and ~sufficient cause' than is plaintiff.~ Both may

bring in any competent ·evidence they have and object to any incompetent evidence." (Italics ours.)
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For a full discussion of the case see defendant's brief on
appeal at pages 23, 24, 25, 26. To the same effect is the
Johnson case discussed in our main brief at pages 26 and
27.
Counsel for the plaintiff and the trial court refused
to recognize the existence of these cases or the soundness
of the principles therein asserted. This field of the law
being a new development, there are very few cases we have
been able to find that were "pinpoint" authorities. We
have found· none holding contrary and counsel has at no
time cited any.
There are, however, two cases of signif~cance which
have been decided since our main brief was written, which
follow the Johnson and Tennison cases and support this
court in that portion of its opinion now assailed.
In Wilson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., ... Mo .
. . . , 247 S. W. 2d 644, decided March 10, 1952, rehearing
denied April 14, 1952 by the Supreme Court of Missouri,
the facts in so far as pertinent were these: Wilson, an
engineer, was discharged by the defendant for failure to
observe and obey certain signals, which resulted in a train
wreck. In a suit for damages against the defendant he
charged that he was "discharged without just and sufficient
cause after a purported investigation and hearing which
was entirely arbitrary." (This is precisely what the plaintiff contends for in this suit.) The railroad company took
the position that Wilson, the employe in this instance, was
confined at the trial to the evidence brought out at the hearing. The trial court permitted Wilson to produce whatever
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evidence he had that he had obeyed the sig-nals and the question of whether there \vas just and sufficient cause for
his discharge \Vas litig-ated before the jury. The trial court
instructed that it was for the jury to determine whether
just and sufficient cause for the discharg-e in fact existed,
and this action \Vas affirmed by the Supreme Court. The
court said:
"Wilson's evidence at the trial tended to show
that he obeyed the sig-nals, the railroad's evidence
tended to show that he violated the sig-nals and the
rules, and whether he did or did not and whether
he was discharged without good and sufficient cause
were for the jury to determine."
This, we submit, is consistent with the opinion of this court
upon which plaintiff's counsel asks this court to now reverse itself and grant a rehearing.
In the case of Craig v. Thompson, . . . Mo. . .. , 244 S.
W. 2d 37, decided November 12, 1951 and since we wrote
our main brief on appeal, the facts so far as pertinent were
as follows: The plaintiff, a brakeman, was discharged for
failure to answer a work call and thereafter brought suit
in tlle courts to recover damages for unlawful discharge.
He claimed that he was wrongfully and unlawfully discharged by the defendant, that the discharge was not for
good and sufficient cause, and he was not accorded a fair
and impartial investigation by the defendant, in violation
of the company's agreement with its employes. The court
in its opinion said:
"The basic facts determinative of this appeal
upon the question of whether plaintiff's discharge
was or was not wrongful are not in dispute."
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But the court held that the question as to whether or not
the discharge was rightful or wrongful was to be passed
upon and decided by the court or jury. The court said :
"Whether a certain state of facts as to which
there is no dispute amounts to a legal justification
for discharge i. e., whether the discharge was or
was not wrongtul, is a question of law for the court,
but where the facts are in dispute as to whether the
discharge was or was not wrongful, the question is
always one for the jury under proper instructions."
This case likewise supports this court in its holding upon
this proposition which is the subject of attack in plaintiff's
petition for rehearing. These are cases involving the alleged breach of collective bargaining agreements entered
into pursuant to the National Railway Labor Act. These
cases concern themselves with the "fundamental contention" made by us,. as does this court in its opinion. Counsel
attacks the holding of the court upon this "fundamental
contention", but in no respect does he address himself pertinently thereto. He concentrates upon the proposition that
Rule 38 was not complied with before the plaintiff was
discharged, a matter upon which he might be entitled to
be heard before the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
But in a court of law such an argument is utterly inconsistent with the proposition laid down by the above cited
cases and by this court in the main opinion to the effect
that in the trial of a common-law action for wrongful discharge the common-law principles relative to such action
apply to the trial of the case. And that it is for the judge
or jury in. the last analysis to determine whether the discharge was wrongful or not. The plaintiff chose his forum
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and must therefore permit the courts to adjudicate the
questions involved. This court in its opinion has said that
the question for decision by the trial court is whether or
not the plaintiff was unjustly discharged, and the opinion
says to us, "In this case it (defendant) must win or lose
upon that issue." We are content with this holding; think
we are entitled to that much and no more. What is there
about it that is "unfair, unjust or inequitable" to the plaintiff or to other employes that'may in the future be similarly
situated? This court's opinion preserves to the plaintiff
all the rights and remedies any litigant at any time has ever
had in the courts in the kind of action that he himself
elected to bring. The plaintiff asks this court in defiance
of the opinion in the Slocum case, supra, to usurp the jurisdiction and prerogatives or the National Railroad Adjustment Board. It seems to us that the plaintiff endeavors
to secure for himself the advantages that might have come
to him from a hearing before ·the Railroad Adjustment
Board, escape the disadvantages of a hearing before such
Board, and to secure for himself such advantages as he has
before a court or jury- without submitting to the established
rules of practice and procedure applicable in actions of this
kind. Even prior to the Slocum case the plaintiff would
have been required to make an election to proceed either
in the courts or take his grievance to the Board, and it
was generally held that once he made the election he was
bound thereby.
CONCLUSION
We concede the right of plaintiff's counsel to get himself in as good a position as possible for the retrial of this
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case. We disagree with many things he has said in the
brief and many interpretations he has put upon various
incidental statements of the court. We do not believe, however,· that a discussion of anything other than this one
"fundamental proposition" is called for here and we are
satisfied to confine ourselves to the one issue counsel has
elected to attack the opinion upon.
We respectfully submit that the Petition for Rehearing
should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
MARVIN J. BERTOCH,
Counsel for Defendant
and Appellant.

10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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